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The Regulation of An Invisible Enemy: The 
International Community's Response to 
Land Mine Proliferation 
INTRODUCTION: PROFILE OF A VICTIM 
1993, Southern Angola. 
It is a beautiful day in Mupa, Kunene and things seem normal at the 
village as the residents cautiously walk towards their houses. The latest 
war scare has passed and after several days of hiding in the bushes, it 
should be safe to return home.! The children are excited and are 
trying to determine who will be the one to run the fastest to the foot 
of the village.2 Crezencia arrives first.3 Her prize was the excruciating 
pain of shrapnel shooting up the length of her body.4 "A land mine 
planted in the entrance of the living area exploded under the pres-
sure of [her] foot,"5 causing fragments of bone to implant themselves 
throughout her body and face. 6 At the time of the explosion, Crezencia 
was just fourteen years 01d.7 
Crezencia differs from most victims of land mines because she was 
lucky enough to receive medical treatment.8 She was transported by 
cart to an area hospital and then to a Catholic mission.9 With the help 
of charitable organizations, she underwent numerous operations that 
saved her life.lO Crezencia's life, however, has been dramatically altered. 
Her face is permanently disfigured, and the explosion caused so much 
nerve damage tllat the doctors needed to amputate her leg. ll She now 
uses a prosthetic leg to walk.!2 Additionally, she relies on charitable 
1 See The Mutilated Life of Crez.encia, JOURNAL DE ANGOLA (visited Mar. 6,1998) <http://www. 
landmine.org/ story / crezeng.html>. 
2 See id. 
3 See id. 
4 See id. 
5Id. 
6 See The Mutilated Life of Crezencia, supra note 1. 
7 See id. 
S See id. 
9 See id. 
10 See id. 
11 See The Mutilated Life of Crez.encia, supra note 1. 
12 See id. 
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organizations to finish what seems like an endless course of reconstruc-
tive surgery.I3 Due to her family's financial circumstances, Crezencia 
will rely on these organizations to continually update the prosthetic leg 
that her family can not possibly afford to replace.14 
Unfortunately, Crezencia's story is not uncommon in countries in-
fested with land mines. I5 The problem is so widespread that millions 
of mines are currently buried in over seventy countries in Mrica, Asia, 
Europe, the Middle East and the Americas. I6 
The International Committee of the Red Cross [hereinafter ICRC] 
reports that over the last fifty-five years, more casualties and injuries 
have resulted from anti-personnel land mines than from nuclear, bio-
logical and chemical weapons combined. 17 "The ICRC [further] esti-
mates that 800 people are killed by land mines every month, and 
another 1,200 are maimed: a total of 2,000 victims a month" or one 
victim every twenty minutes. I8 The Canadian Department of Foreign 
Mfairs and International Trade .reports that 90% of those victims are 
civilians, many of them children. I9 
Part I of this note will explore the problems associated with land 
mines including who is affected, and what happens after land mines 
are laid. Part II will discuss the history of land mines over the past sixty 
years and international attempts to deal with their aftermath leading 
to the current international treaties signed. Part III will assess the 
effectiveness of the international response especially in light of the fact 
that several large users and producers of land mines have not commit-
ted themselves to the most recent effort-The Ottawa Treaty. This note 
concludes with a recommendation for the adoption of the Ottawa 
Process by the major international leaders who have not already ra-
13 See id. 
14 See id. 
15 See Anti-Personnel Mines: An Overview, INT'L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, (visited Mar. 3, 1998) 
<http://www.icrc.ch/unicc/icrenews.nsf>. 
16 See id. "The most severely affected countries are Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Cambodia, Croatia, Eritrea, Iraq (Kurdistan), Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan, and Viet 
Nam." Id. 
17 See id. The Office on Global Education/CWSW defines anti-personnel land mines as "any 
munition placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area, designed to be exploded 
by the presence, proximity or contact of a person, and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one 
or more persons." Landmines: Fallout of War, CHURCH WORLD SERVICE, (visited Mar. 9, 1998) 
<http://www.ncccusa.org.cws/minefs.html> . 
18 See id. 
19 See Safe Lane, The Ottawa Process and Canada:S Position, DEP'T FOREIGN AFF. & INT'L TRADE 
(visited Mar. 3, 1998) <http://www.mines.gc.ca/ottbck-e.htm> . 
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tified the treaty. It also advocates using political and social pressure to 
convince nations to sign onto the treaty if they have not already done 
so. Furthermore, it encourages the use of international funds to help 
pay for removal efforts and reparations to injured victims with the 
funds to be paid primarily by the countries responsible for laying the 
land mines. 
I. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH LAND MINES AND THOSE 
INDIVIDUALS MOST AT RISK 
The use of land mines has expanded greatly in the past several 
decades, driven by improvements in land mine technology.20 Advance-
ments, such as using plastics and ceramics, have dramatically reduced 
the cost of producing the mines.21 By reducing the metal content and 
consequently the price, land mine producers have greatly expanded 
the market for the weapon. 22 As a result, land mines can be laid very 
easily, fairly quickly and in a variety ofways.23 For example, they can be 
placed by hand, artillery, mortar, or aircraft. 24 The International Cam-
paign to Ban Landmines [hereinafter ICBL] estimates that ten to 
twenty million land mines are currently being produced per year. 25 
The consequence of this mass production and resulting dissemina-
tion of land mines is astonishing. 26 The U.S. State Department esti-
mates that land mines injure or kill "an estimated five hundred people 
per week worldwide."27 Many of those who fall victim to land mines die 
within the first few minutes of the explosion.28 Those who survive face 
massive scarring, the threat of amputation of a leg or an arm and 
whatever reconstructive surgery becomes necessary.2f1 
The victim's suffering is further exacerbated because access to medi-
cal care is Iimited.30 Many victims who are not killed immediately die 
20 See Janet E. Lord, Legal Restraints in the Use of Landmines: Humanitarian and Environmental 
Crisis, 25 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 311, 313 (1995). 
21 See id. 
22 See id. 
23 See id. 
24 See id. 
25 See Landmines: Fallout of War, supra note 17. 
26 See id. 
27/d. 
28 See id. 
29 See id. 
30 See Anti-Personnel Mines: An Overview, supra note 15. 
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on route to medical attention.31 Those who are fortunate enough to 
find medical attention may be receiving a limited quality of care since 
many victims do not possess adequate funds to pay for their treat-
ment.32 Moreover, many land mine-ridden countries do not have the 
funds and technology necessary to provide medical care for their 
citizens, so whatever facilities are available are filled with victims who 
must rely on charities and other humanitarian aid to pay their medical 
costS.33 This puts a strain on scarce medical and financial resources and 
whatever technology exists. 34 
A good number of victims affected today are civilians, such as farm-
ers harvesting crops or tending to household chores and children.35 
Children are at great risk because they are naturally curious and are 
less likely to recognize the danger that land mines possess.36 Govern-
mental and humanitarian mine awareness programs in land mine-in-
fested countries teach residents in those countries how to detect and 
avoid land mines.37 Additionally, these programs try to teach critical 
skills in avoidance of dangerous areas, notification to designated per-
sonnel charged with mine awareness and mine clearance activities, and 
noninterference with personnel conducting demining activity.38 How-
ever, often times the education they are given on the subject matter is 
not useful against the mines laid completely underground or against 
mines that are laid in overgrown fields since smaller children cannot 
see over the tall grass. 39 
In addition to the toll land mines take in injury and death, land 
mine proliferation also creates social, physical and economic problems 
within the affected country.40 In 1993, the United States Department 
of State concluded that: 
Landmines pose a severe threat to the availability of land, 
water supplies and infrastructure. They render large tracts 
of agricultural land unusable, often causing malnutrition or 
31 See id. 
32 See id. 
33 See id. 
34 See id. 
35 See Landmines: Fallaut of War, supra note 17. 
36 See id. 
37 See BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, PUB. No. 10225, HIDDEN 
KILLERS: THE GU)BAL LANDMINE CRISIS 35 (1994). 
38 See id. 
39 See Landmines: Fallaut of War, supra note 17. 
40 See Lord, supra note 20, at 31l. 
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starvation among agrarian populations. In some countries, 
active mines have shifted, and were swept into community 
water supplies causing contamination and ultimately, a variety 
of water-borne diseases. Similarly, [land mines] hinder the 
construction of railways, roads, and bridges, which in turn 
disrupts the flow of trade and commerce necessary for devel-
opment.4l 
469 
Furthermore, the fact that land mines cut off water supplies and 
render land unfit for farming has led to the mass migrations of once 
agrarian people and the over-population of urban cities. 42 Land mines 
are typically scattered throughout affected areas, thus frightening 
farmers and their families away from their fields 43 and leaving other-
wise fertile soil uncultivated for years.44 Accordingly, land mines have 
been criticized as one of the greatest public health hazards of the late 
twentieth century.4!i 
Moreover, even though land mines are typically laid during times of 
unrest within or between countries, their proliferation may undermine 
reconstruction efforts years after the conflict has ended.46 Refugee 
repatriation becomes extremely difficult for those displaced to other 
countries during armed conflictY Land mine barriers erected at bor-
ders or even within the displaced territory make the trip from refugee 
camps back to the homeland difficult and treacherous. 4R Many refugee 
lives are lost in the journey home, even after the conflict that drove 
them from their homes has long passed.49 
Land mines pose an additional impediment to refugee and recon-
struction efforts in desert areas.!iO In affected lands, the shifting desert 
sands make removal efforts difficult since the sands further bury land 
mines making them almost impossible to locate with the naked eye or 
regular detection methods.!i1 This has resulted in the securing of large 
41 Safe Lane: Frequently Ashed Questions, DEP'T FOREIGN AFF. & INT'L TRADE (visited Mar. 3, 
1998) <http://www.mines.gc.ca/faq-e.htm>. 
42 See Lord, supra note 20, at 317. 
43 See id. 
44 See BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra note 37, at 13. 
45 See Exposing the Source: U.S. Companies and the Production of Anti-Personnel Mines-II, HUM. 
RTS. WATCH, (visited Mar. 26, 1999) <http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/mines/II.html>. 
46 See BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra note 37 at 9. 
47 See Lord, supra note 20, at 318. 
48 See id. 
49 See id. 
50 See id. at 316. 
51 See id. 
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tracts of land as inaccessible to ensure that civilians do not wander into 
such areas.52 
Less developed countries seeking to rid their lands of this scourge 
are frequently hindered by insufficient resources and technology nec-
essary to effectively demine their affected territories.53 These countries 
must rely heavily on international aid to help with removal and edu-
cation efforts. 54 The United Nations estimates that the average cost of 
clearing one mine ranges from U.S. $200-$100055 as compared to 
the U.S. $3.00-$30.00 it costs to produce a single device.56 Conse-
quently, the cost of removing the mines far exceeds the cost of produc-
ing themY Very often the land mine infested country that receives no 
aid must choose economic development over land mine reduction. 58 
Hence, some of these countries are forced to leave the mines intact, 
increasing the potential for disaster on unsuspecting civilians and 
rendering the natural resource base unusable. 59 
With approximately 500 lives being injured or lost a week, and the 
concurrent damage to farming resources and water supplies, land 
mines have become a major problem facing infested countries. lio In 
addition to the toll on human life, the economic effects make life even 
more difficult for innocent civilians who are left to deal with the 
damage that land mines create.ill 
II. HISTORY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE 
PROLIFERATION OF LAND MINES 
A. Early History 
The first widespread use of land mines as a means of curtailing an 
enemy attack began during World War 1.62 Land mines were a focal 
52 See Lord, supra note 20, at 316. 
53 See id. at 321-22. 
54 See BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra note 37, at 32. 
55 See id. at 14. 
56 See Anti-Personnel Mines: An Overview, supra note 15. 
57 See id. 
58 See Lord, supra note 20, at 322. 
59 See id. 
60 See Anti-Personnel !vlines: An Overvie-w, supra note 15. 
61 See id. 
62 Howard S. Levie, Landmines: A Deadly Legacy. By the Arms Project of Human Rights Watch/Phy-
sicians for Human Rights, AM. J. INT'L L. 565, 565 (1994) (book review); BUREAU OF POLITICAL-
MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra note 37, at 3. 
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point of the German strategy against the Allied powers, particularly 
France and Great Britain.63 The traditional military philosophy behind 
laying land mines was as a defensive, tactical battlefield weapon,64 
"developed to impede the removal of antitank mines and to prevent 
enemy penetration of protective minefields. "65 Moreover, they were 
"intended to protect open flanks, deny access to routes and strategic 
positions, restrict the enemy forces' ability to maneuver, and force 
them to deploy in areas where they are vulnerable or least likely to 
attack with success."6Il 
Today, in addition to defensive use, land mines are increasingly 
considered a strategic offensive weapon,'i7 despite the reality that many 
innocent parties, primarily farmers and children, are the actual victims 
of land mine explosions.68 With this strategy, land mines have devel-
oped into a means of permanently protecting areas regardless of the 
existence of an imminent threat. 69 
The devastation caused by land mines has been a problem on the 
forefront of international policy since the 1970s.70 Studies conducted 
since that time have revealed the widespread damage land mines have 
created.7l For example, one 1993 U.S. State Department report showed 
that the number of civilian casualties caused by land mines had 
reached appalling proportions with approximately 150 people being 
injured per week.72 The figures showed that, at that time, between 65 
and 100 million land mines were scattered throughout 62 countries 
with more being laid every day.73 More recent estimates point out that 
these figures may have been grossly underestimated.74 This begs the 
question of who should bear the responsibility of removing the land 
mines from areas where war or armed conflict is no longer an is-
63 See Levie, supra note 62, at 566. As a result, countries like Germany are still removing land 
mines left over from that period of history. See BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra 
note 37, at 25. 
64 See Levie, supra note 62, at 566. 
65 BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra note 37, at 3. 
66 See Anti-personnel Mines: An Overview, supra note 15. 
67 See Levie, supra note 62, at 566. 
68 See Landmines: Fallout of War, supra note 17. 
69 See id. 
70 See generally United Nations Conference on Prohibition or Restrictions of Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons: Final Act, 191.L.M. 1523 (1980). 
71 See generally BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra note 37. 
72 See id. at 2. 
73 See id. at l. 
74 See Landmines: Fallout of War, supra note 17. 
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sue. The world community has attempted to respond to this concern 
through international resolutions and treaties, but these measures 
have not definitively settled the question of whether the proposed 
solutions are workable.75 
The following sections will discuss what the international response 
has been to land mines.7fi Many non-governmental organizations and 
concerned individuals campaigned to get this issue brought to the 
international community's attention. 77 This effort has resulted in sev-
eral international conferences being held and several treaties being 
signed over the past thirty years. 78 
B. The Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
From World War I to the 1970s, land mines were left largely unregu-
lated.79 The first real international movement towards curbing the use 
of land mines occurred during the 1970's.80 That movement culmi-
nated in a United Nations response in 1980 when the world community 
ratified the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions 
of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons: Final Act [hereinafter CCW 
(1980)].81 Appendix C of the CCW specifically dealt with the issue of 
land mines [hereinafter Protocol II (1980)] .82 The primary objective 
of the CCW (1980) and Protocol II (1980) was the protection of 
civilians.83 Specifically, Protocol II (1980) reiterated much of what 
international custom said about mine warfare.84 International custom 
75 See Anti-Personnel Mines: An Overview, supra note 15. 
76 See infra notes 77-189 and accompanying text. 
77 See Safe Lane, The Ottawa Process and Canada's Position, supra note 19. 
78 See United Nations: Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and Their Destruction, 36 LL.M. 1507 (1997) [hereinafter 
Ottawa Treaty]; Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibition 01' Restriction 
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons "11ich May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious 
or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 35 LL.M. 1206 (1996) [hereinafter CCW (1996)]; United 
Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons: 
Final Act, 19 I.L.M. 1523 (1980) [hereinafter CCW (1980)]. 
79 See Jack H. McCall, Jr., Infernal Machines and Hidden Death: International Law and Limits on 
the Indiscriminate Use of Land Mine Warfare, 24 GA. J. INT'L. & COMPo L. 229, 230 (1994). 
80 See id. at 230-31. 
81 See CCW (1980), supra note 78. 
82 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices 
(1980), (Protocol II) 19 LL.M. 1523, 1529 [hereinafter 1980 Protocol II]. 
83 See Michael J. Matheson, Current Development: The Revision of the Mines Protocol, 91 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 158, 158 (1997). 
84 See McCall, supra note 79, at 254. 
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requires that all measures be taken to protect the lives of civilians. 85 
This necessitates that all targets be military in nature and thus prohibits 
the use of land mines solely as a method of attacking civilians.86 
In accordance with these general prohibitions, Protocol II's Article 
4 focused attention on the locations of military objectives by specifically 
prohibiting the use of land mines in civilian areas.S7 The Protocol listed 
several exceptions which allowed the use of land mines near civilian 
populations if (a) the mines were placed near a likely military objec-
tive, or (b) adequate measures were taken to protect civilian lives. s8 
These measures included "the posting of warning signs, the posting of 
sentries, the issue of warnings or the provision of fences."s9 Addition-
ally, Article 5 banned the use of remotely delivered mines in certain 
situations.90 It also required that all mines be adequately recorded or 
designed with self-destruct features.'ll 
Despite the attempts Protocol II (1980) made towards protecting 
civilians from the indiscriminate use ofland mines, many international 
groups and individual countries were nonetheless disappointed by the 
CCW (1980) because of its failure to ban land mines completely, and 
its perceived weakness in truly controlling the use ofland mines.92 One 
major problem cited was that the restriction on the use of land mines 
had no effect on countries that were using the mines during times of 
internal conflicts; therefore, many of the trouble areas of the past two 
decades were unaffected by the treaty.93 
Secondly, Article 9 advocated joint mine removal efforts and the 
sharing of technological information by its signatories.'l4 However, a 
problem could ensue where a nation laying the land mines against an 
85 See id. The CCW relied heavily on certain provisions of a 1977 Protocol established by the 
Geneva Convention. See id. at 265 n.187. This Protocol, established a norm by "(1) prohibiting 
[the] starvation of civilians as a method of war and (2) prohibiting [the] attacking, destroying 
or removing [of] 'items indispensable to the survival of the civilian population .... '" [d. at 265 
n.187. Therefore, lIsing land mines as a tactic to cut off food and water supplies was off limits 
for those purposes. See id. 
8GSee CCW (1980), supra note 78,19 I.L.M. at 1531, art. 4, app. C. 
87 See id. This article states that "It is prohibited to use weapons to which this Article applies in 
any city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians in which combat 
between ground forces is not taking place or does not appear to be imminent. ... " [d. 
88 See id. 
89 [d. 
90 See CCW (1980), supra note 78, 19 I.L.M. at 1531, art. 5. 
91 See id. 
!)2 See Levie, supra note 62, at 566-67. 
93 See McCall, supra note 79, at 264. 
94 See id. at 262. 
474 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XXII, No.2 
enemy will also be the nation with the greatest resources and informa-
tion regarding land mines. If this occurs, it may be difficult for the 
nation requiring mine location information, mine removal assistance 
and reparations to receive that assistance. Article 9 presumes that such 
removal efforts between two nations would be easy to orchestrate, even 
though the parties were, up until quite recently, in armed conflict with 
one another.95 This is especially problematic if the information sought 
is seen as vital to the national defense to the nations that laid the land 
mines.96 Additionally, the CCW (1980) did not specifY a time frame for 
when such efforts should occur,97 This left open the possibility that 
these efforts would not occur until years after the conflict had ceased.98 
Such provisions have been denounced as illusory in the past both 
because of the ill feelings that exist between countries after armed 
conflict and also because of the lack of a real enforcement mechanism 
that accompanies the provisionY9 
Moreover, many of the provisions contained in the CCW (1980) 
diluted its main focus, the preservation of the innocent civilian popu-
lation. 100 Although the CCW was adopted to protect civilians, the "gen-
eral obligation of the parties . . . to 'remove or render harmless all 
mines' is established only to protect a UN force or mission performing 
peacekeeping, observation or similar functions in a given area if the 
head of the mission so requests."IUI 
Further contributing to the failure to curb the proliferation of land 
mines, the 1980 Protocol II did not make it incumbent on the placers 
of the mines to ensure responsibility for removal efforts nor for paying 
damages.](j2 The responsibility for mine removal remained with the 
country where the mine was placed. 103 This completely ignored the fact 
that many of these countries did not have the resources, technology 
or money to deal with the problem. 104 
95 See id. 
96 See id. 
97 See generally CCW (1980), supra note 78. 
98 See McCall, supra note 79, at 262 n.I73. 
99 See id. 
100 See Karl Josef Partsch, Remnants of War as a Legal Problem in the Light of the Libyan Case, 78 
AM. J. INT'L L. 386, 391 (1984). 
!Olld. 
102 See id. at 392. 
!O3 See id. at 391. 
104 See generally BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra note 37, at 44-52. 
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Finally, the CCW did not address past actions since its restrictions 
and obligations were completely prospective. 105 Therefore, past actions 
were essentially given a clean slate, and the land mine infested coun-
try was left to deal with its aftermath. lOG Mter securing the CCW's 
passage, the international community did not specifically address the 
land mines issue for years. 
C. Measures Leading Up to the Review Conference 
As the years ensued after the signing of the CCW (1980), the horrors 
of the land mines still existed. 107 The shortcomings of the CCW (l980) 
had begun to be realized as more land mines were continually being 
placed every day in various countries around the world with more and 
more victims being claimed. lu8 As the death and injury toll mounted, 
non-governmental organizations opposed to the proliferation of land 
mines increased their campaign against these weapons. 109 These non-
governmental organizations and special interest groups employed the 
aid of major international figures to draw the international commu-
nity's attention to the horror of land mines. 110 One such prominent 
figure was Diana, Princess of Wales. III 
Princess Diana's highly publicized trips to land mine infested coun-
tries (such as Bosnia and Angola) and her visits with victims of land 
mines drew widespread public attention to the matter. 1I2 Newspaper 
articles, radio broadcasts and TV news stories based on these meetings 
appeared all over the globe.1I3 Thanks in large part to her efforts, in 
1997, after the Princess' tragic death, the British government "an-
100 See Partsch, supra note 100, at 39l. 
106 See id. 
107 See Landmines: Fallout of War; supra note 17. 
108 See Matheson, supra note 83, at 159. The United Nations estimated that while 80,000 mines 
were cleared in 1995,2.5 million were simultaneously being installed in various regions around 
the world. See American Chemical Society, Land Mines: Horrors Begging for Solutions, CHEMICAL 
& ENGINEERING NEWS, Mar. 10, 1997 (visited Jan. 15, 1998) <http://www.pubs.acs.org/hotartcl/ 
cenear/97031 O/land.html>. 
109 See Has U.S. Given up on Land Mine Ban?NAT'L CATH. REP., Mar. 5, 1999, available in 1999 
WL 8553880. 
lIO See id. 
111 See MSN News: Today, Call for Land Mine Ban as Tribute to Diana (visited Mar. 9, 1998) 
<http://\\ww.news.uk.msll.com/news/4105.asp>. 
112 See Championing the Anti-Landmine Cause (visited Mar. 10, 1998) <http://w\\w.bbc.co.uk/ 
politics97 /diana/mine.html>. 
113 See Call for Land Mine Ban as Tribute to Diana, supra note 111. 
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nounced a complete ban on any British trade in landmines and a 
moratorium on their operation use with UK forces."Jl4 
Additionally, the British government announced at the same time 
that the country would "destroy all its stocks of anti-personnellandmi-
nes by 2005 [or until such time that an international ban treaty had 
been adopted] and look at ways to speed up their destruction." The 
concept of replacing some of the stocks with 'smart mines' which 
self-destruct after a set period [had] been dropped."115 This proclama-
tion came forth despite concerns from government conservatives who 
opposed a member of the Royal family publicly delving into a political 
issue l16 and specifically, an issue that had amounted to a lucrative 
export for that nation. ll7 
In addition to Princess Diana's advocacy throughout the 1990s, other 
nations in the world community were concurrently responding to the 
land mines crisis with similar action. In 1993, the UN General Assembly 
passed the Moratorium on the Export of Anti-Personnel Land Mines 
Resolution. Jl8 "In December 1994, the UN General Assembly adopted 
resolution (49/75D) calling for the 'eventual elimination' of land 
mines."Jl9 While this resolution did nothing immediate to resolve the 
issue ofland mines, it was a mandate for the United Nation participants 
to come forth with a solution. 120 Various countries also responded by 
taking individual stands to curb the use of land mines. 121 
The U.S., for example, used its export control policies to restrict the 
number ofland mines being sold abroad. 122 "Under the United States' 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which is managed 
by the State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls, all exports 
or re-exports of 'defense articles and services' (i.e., all goods or services 
that are inherently military in character) must be licensed by United 
States government before being sold abroad. "123 'Land mines were 
114 Governrnent Announces Landrnine Ban, BBC (visited Mar. 10, 1998) <http:/ hvww.bbc.co.uk/ 
politics97/ news/05/0521/ mines.shtml>. 
115 See id. 
116 Charnpioning the Anti-Landrnine Cause, supra note 112. 
m See id. 
liS See McCall, supra note 79, at 268 (citing General and Complete Disarmament Report of the 
1st Committee, 200 G.A. Res. 48/75 K, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/48/676 (1993)). 
119 Landrnines: Fallout of Wa/; supra note 17. 
120 See id. 
121 See McCall, supra note 79, at 268-69. 
122 See id. 
123Id. 
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specifically included under the rubric of ITAR.124 The results from that 
inclusion were remarkable, since the U.S. "approved only ten licenses 
for commercial export of mines worth $980,000 and sales of 108,852 
antipersonnel mines. "125 
Moreover, the 1992 Defense Appropriation Act which provided for 
a one year moratorium on all land exports was extended to a total of 
four years. 12G The moratorium included a ban on the use of land mines, 
"except along internationally recognized borders and demilitarized 
zones."127 Some time later, President Clinton had called for the destruc-
tion of four million "dumb" land mines by 1999.128 He excluded the 
use of mines for training purposes and those necessary to protect 
demilitarized areas such as South Korea. 129 This moratorium was part 
of the U.S.' larger goal of completely prohibiting the manufacture and 
sale of land mines. 130 France and the European Community followed 
suit with similar moratoriums of their own.131 
In 1995, the effort to amend the CCW, and specifically Protocol II 
(1980), to make it a stronger treaty in the fight against land mines and 
other such weapons of indiscriminate destruction culminated in the 
1996 Conference that amended the CCW (1980) and Protocol II 
(1980).132 The new CCW and specifically, the amended Protocol II, 
addressed what were perceived to be some of the biggest problems with 
the 1980 CCW.133 Among the commonly cited problems during the 
CCW Review discussions were the fact that "the CCW covered only 
international armed conflicts (those between states), and it did not 
provide for verification or compliance. "134 The final product was a 
treaty that restricted some types of land mine use and created guide-
lines for how and where land mines should be laid. 135 These new 
guidelines applied to the proliferation of all land mines in all situ-
ations-not just conflicts that occurred between nations. 136 
124 See id. at 269. 
125 McCall, supra note 79, at 269. 
126 Landmines: Fallout of War, supra note 17. 
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128 See id. Dumb land mines are mines that are incapable of self-destruction. See id. 
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130 See McCall, supra note 79, at 270. 
131 See id. 
132 See CCW (1996), supra note 78. 
133 See Matheson, supra note 83, at 159. 
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The U.S., a supporter of the Review Conference, opposed a total 
prohibition on the use of land mines. J:l7 However, the U.S. became 
active in shaping its own goals for the new treaty that would effectively 
restrict the use of the weapon. 138 These goals included: 
(A) An expansion of the scope [of the Protocol]. to in-
clude internal armed conflicts. 
(B) A requirement that all remotely delivered mines shall be 
equipped with self-destruct devices. 
(C) A requirement that manually emplaced antipersonnel 
mines without self-destruct devices or backup self-deactiva-
tion features shall be used only within controlled, marked, 
and monitored minefields. 
(D) A requirement that all mines shall be detectable using 
commonly available technology. 
(E) A requirement that the party laying mines assumes re-
sponsibility for them. 
(F) The establishment of an effective mechanism to verify 
compliance.139 
This framework was significant because, among other things, it empha-
sized placing responsibility for the laying of land mines. 140 Thus, the 
framework also reflected the need to make someone accountable for 
damage caused by land mines. HI 
Aside from expanding the scope of the CCW to include internal 
armed conflicts, the 1996 Protocol II also protected humanitarian 
workers stationed in areas where there is conflict; placed responsibility 
on the nation laying land mines to remove the weapons as soon as the 
conflict is over; created guidelines for prospectively using land mines 
with self-destruct features; made some prohibitions on transfers; and 
scheduled a follow up conference meeting in 2001 to discuss the results 
of the new Protocol. I42 Protocol II's attention to many of the issues 
137 See Jim Lobe, Disarrnarnent-US: Clinton Pressured to Ban Landrnines, WORLD NEWS IPS 
(visited Mar. 9, 1998) <http:/ hvww.oneworld.org/ips2/sep/landmines2.html>. 
138 See Matheson, supra note 83, at 160. 
139 See id. 
140 See id. 
141 See id. 
142 See Review of Landrnine Protocol Falls Short of Ban, UNITED NATIONS (visited Mar. 3, 1998) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/NewsLetter/ 1_3/review.html>. 
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considered deficient with the 1980 CCW, led to the 1996 Protocol 
being adopted in Geneva in May, 1996.143 
The Treaty, however, was still seen as a disappointment to those who 
supported a total ban on land mines. 144 Most countries, however, real-
ized that, like the 1980 CCW, the 1996 Protocol II was a compromise 
measure to ensure that the world community would accept the obliga-
tions the new Protocol placed on them.145 Although many hoped for a 
stronger agreement, Protocol II's (1996) shortcomings were the result 
of political compromises that needed to take place to ensure the 
passage of the treaty.146 "Like most international conferences, the Re-
view Conference operated on the basis of consensus. "147 The CCW 
drafters knew that they would never be able to muster enough support 
for a total ban since countries such as Russia, China, India and Pakistan 
refused to consider that result.148 The drafters therefore sought to do 
as much as they could in writing the amendment to assure its passage.149 
President Clinton, in his January 7th, 1997 letter of transmittal to 
Congress regarding Protocol II reflected this sentiment.15o The letter 
stated: 
[t]he amended Mines Protocol was not as strong as we would 
have preferred. In particular, its provision on verification and 
compliance are not as rigorous as we had proposed, and the 
transition periods allowed for the conversion or elimination 
of certain non-compliant mines are longer than we thought 
necessary. We shall pursue these issues in the regular meet-
ings that the amended Protocol provides for review of its 
operation. lSI 
President Clinton concluded this transmission with his belief that the 
1996 Protocol II would help save thousands of lives.152 
143 See id. 
144 See id. 
145 See Matheson, supra note 83, at 159. 
146 See id. 
147Id. at 160. 
148 See id. at 159. 
149 See id. 
150 See Marion Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 91 
AM. J. INT'L L. 325, 325-26 (1997). 
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In reality, the amended Protocol was a necessary compromise ap-
proach to the complex problems surrounding the use of land mines. 153 
As mentioned earlier, many countries such as Russia, China, India and 
Pakistan opposed the ban for various reasons. l54 A key reason for failing 
to support a ban was national security.155 Other countries had strongly 
objected to the amended Protocol probably because they feared inter-
vention in its domestic affairs and policies.156 Protocol II's drafting 
committee won acceptance by reaffirming the Geneva Convention's 
principle that "this extension may not be used as an excuse for unlaw-
ful intervention into domestic conflicts. "157 
Despite the criticisms of Protocol II (1996), it is significant because 
it was the first international agreement signed that fully emphasized 
civilian life and addressed key problems with the 1980 CCW.158 Buoyed 
by a victory, the international community challenged the world to meet 
again to discuss a measure that would completely ban the use of land 
mines. The result was the Ottawa Process and the United Nations 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction [hereinaf-
ter Ottawa Treaty] .159 
D. The Ottawa Process 
Following the negotiations which led to the signing of the 1996 
Protocol II, a group of countries disappointed that the amended Pro-
tocol did not result with a ban of land mines met in Geneva to discuss 
what other action could be taken to reduce the consequences associ-
ated with land mine use. 160 The group meeting attendees concluded 
that the only solution to the damage created by land mines was a 
complete ban on their manufacture, stockpiling, sale and use. 161 The 
rationale was that only through a total ban could the international 
community ensure safety from the indiscriminate use of land mines. 162 
153 See Matheson, supra note 83, at 159. 
154 See id. 
155 See id. 
156 See id. at 161. 
157 See id. 
158 See Matheson, supra note 83, at 159. 
159 Ottawa Treaty, supra note 78. 
160 See Safe Lane, The Ottawa Process and Canada's Position, supra note 19. 
161 See id. 
162 See Safe Lane, Frequently Asked QJtestions, DEP'T FOREIGN AFF. & INT'L TRADE (visited Mar. 
3, 1998) <http://www.mines.gc.ca/faq-e.htm1>. 
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Additionally, history had already proven how effective bans on unpopu-
lar weapons could be. 163 For example, bans on the use of poison gas, 
bacteriological warfare and dum-dum bullets have been very effective 
over the past 60 years in preventing their use against foreign military 
and the civilian population during conflict. 164 
The next step was an October 1996 meeting held in Canada with 
ICRC, the ICBL, seventy-four countries, the UN, UNICEF, the UN 
Department of Humanitarian Affairs, the Federation of Red Cross 
Societies, and representatives of other non-governmental organiza-
tions interested in banning the use of land mines. 165 By the end of this 
initial meeting, all of the conference representatives were challenged 
to complete the negotiations process in a year and at the end of that 
period to return to Ottawa to complete the work by signing the end 
product. 166 These series of meetings and the procedure developed to 
ensure that the drafting of the agreement to ban land mines would be 
complete by the end of the stated time frame is known as the Ottawa 
Process. 167 
The Process included several follow-up conferences and working 
meetings scheduled in various host countries around the world signi-
fying world support for the work being performed. ](i8 The Brussels 
Conference held inJune, 1997, brought 155 countries and more than 
100 representatives together to discuss several dimensions of antiper-
sonnel mines and their consequences: the ban, assistance for victims, 
and the clearance of mines. 169 This was a high profile conference and 
many international leaders, "such as UN Secretary-General Kofi An-
nan, Archbishop Desmond Tutu and former US President Jimmy Car-
ter all offered statements of support of the Ottawa Process."170 
Several months later, in Oslo, Norway, formal diplomatic negotia-
tions began. l7l Before sitting down in Oslo, the treaty drafters circu-
lated revisions of drafts and summaries of the work done in order to 
receive the widest possible range of comments. 172 The Oslo Conference 
163 See McCall, supra note 79, at 277. 
164 See id. 
165 See Safe Lane, The Ottawa Process and Canada 5 Position, supra note 19. 
166 See id. 
167 See id. 
168 See id. Host countries included Mozambique, South Africa, Sweden, Turkmenistan, Australia, 
India, Japan, Austria and Germany. See id. 
169 See Safe Lane, The Ottawa Process and Canada 5 Position, supra noll" 19. 
17°Id. 
171 See id. 
172 See id. 
482 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXII, No, 2 
was attended by more than 100 countries with eighty-nine countries 
extending their endorsement of the work produced,173 
In December 1997, 125 nations signed the Ottawa Treaty signifying 
the first official international ban. 174 The treaty gave the United Na-
tions a big role in helping to effectuate its terms. 175 Specifically, Article 
7 made each State Party responsible for reporting their implementa-
tion progress to the UN Secretary General within 180 days after the 
Treaty enters into force. 176 Moreover, the parties are required to accu-
rately account to the Secretary General all stockpiled land mines com-
plete with a breakdown of where the stockpiled land mines are placed 
and how many of each type exist. 177 The parties are also responsible 
for mapping out the location of all stockpiled and currently placed 
land minesI78 and accounting for any stockpiled land mines that are 
retained for training purposes. 179 
Additionally, the Ottawa Treaty imposes requirements for reporting 
on the status of programs designed to convert or destroy land mines180 
and requires that each producer of land mines report the technical 
characteristics of each type of land mine produced. 181 Any party who 
places land mines must also report on the "measures taken to provide 
an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to 
all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5. "182 
Among the countries who refused to sign without more negotiations 
or drafting were the U.S., Russia, China, Israel, Iran, Iraq, North and 
South Korea. 183 These nations comprise some of the heaviest users of 
land mines with Russia, China and Iraq producing the bulk of them. 184 
The countries that did not ratify the Ottawa Treaty rely heavily on 
land mines to protect their territories from aggressors. 185 The main 
173 See id. 
174 See CNN Future Watch (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 7, 1997). Of these 125 countries, 65 
have ratified the Ottawa Treaty as of March 5, 1999. See Paul Brown, Landmines Banned But 
Threats Stay, GUARDIAN, Mar. 2, 1999. 
175 See Ottawa Treaty, supra note 78, art. 6, 36 I.L.M. at 1512. 
176 See id. art. 7(a). 
177 See id. art. 7(b). 
178 See id. at 1513, art. 7(c). 
179 See id. art. 7(d). 
180 See Ottawa Tr'eaty, supra note 78, arts. 7(e)-(f), 36 I.L.M. at 1513. 
181 See id. an. 7(h). 
182 See id. an. 7(i). 
183 See CNN Future Watch, supra note 174. 
184 See Landmines: Treaty Endorsed /Jy 100 Countries but not United States, REFUGEE NEWS (visited 
Mar. 9, 1998) <http://www.members.tripod.com/-refugeenews/sept97mines.html>. 
185 See Landmines: Treaty Endorsed /Jy 100 Countries but not United States, supra note 184. 
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reason that land mines are used by the military is because they are an 
extremely effective means of protection against enemies. 18G Land mines 
can be placed strategically to stop the enemy from advancing over 
borders or protected areas. 187 The ICRC refers to land mines as "sen-
tries that never sleep: alert 24 hours a day [who] perform consistently 
in all weather conditions. "188 They are forever on guard and their low 
price make them the weapon of choice of poor countries who need to 
be able to protect themselves in an efficient, relatively inexpensive 
way. 189 
Advancements in land mine technology-the ability to place them 
through remote delivery systems or through air rather than hand 
placement-has also made land mines a popular choice among more 
developed military forces who value the land mines for the relative 
speed and ease with which they can secure an area. 190 
The remote-delivery systems [are] aimed at severing enemy 
communications, cutting off the enemy's routes of retreat 
and causing chaos in enemy headquarters and resupply cen-
tres behind the lines. The development of the remotely de-
livered mine is held in some quarters to have radically altered 
the nature of mine warfare. In many armies mines are not 
integrated into doctrine as weapons of attack. Accurate map-
ping and recording of remotely delivered mines, usually 
strewn on a massive scale, are virtually impossible .... 191 
Land mines' efficacy in achieving military goals make them a highly 
effective tool in times of conflict. Hence, Russia, China and India did 
not even participate in the Ottawa Process. 192 
The U.S. did not initially support the Ottawa Process but eventually 
participated in negotiations due to the growing political pressure from 
within the country.193 President Clinton's initial position on the matter 
was that the U.S. would negotiate a treaty through the UN Conference 
on Disarmament in Geneva rather than through the Ottawa Process. 194 
186 See Anti-Personnel 111ines: An Overview, supra note 15. 
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He felt that the issue of an international ban should be held within 
the rubric of the Geneva Conference. 1'l5 
The Geneva Conference, however, was not seen as a viable option 
since any measure adopted must undergo a lengthy negotiation proc-
ess, and it was understood that a total ban could not gain universal 
acceptance by all parties. l96 The Ottawa Treaty, by comparison, was 
designed to be an expedited process. 197 At the end of the Ottawa 
planning meeting in October, 1996, the meeting participants were 
challenged to draft the ban treaty and ratify it by the following year, 
signifYing an urgency to put in place a measure to ban land mines. 198 
When the negotiations had resulted in a final treaty, President Clin-
ton opted not to sign because he could not secure certain exemptions 
to the ban. 199 The President unsuccessfully sought an exception for 
U.S. forces in Korea stating that land mines were necessary to "protect 
South Korea and the 37,000 U.S. troops stationed there from a possible 
land invasion by North Korea across the 1953 armistice line .... "200 
Clinton also sought an exemption for land mines that are used to deter 
enemy tanks.201 The President argued that these types of mines were 
capable of self-destruction and did little damage to the civilian popu-
lation.202 He stated that "as commander-in-chief, [he would] not send 
our soldiers to defend the freedom of our people and the freedom of 
others without doing everything we can to make them as secure as 
possible. "203 
The position President Clinton has taken has evoked sharp criticism 
from home and abroad.204 The ban on land mines gained bipartisan 
support in Congress with more than 60 members of the U.S. Senate 
alone sponsoring legislation to ban land mines. 205 Congressmen sup-
porting the ban include Senators Patrick Leahy and Lane Evans, in 
addition to every Senator who was a veteran of combat in the Vietnam 
195 See id. 
1\)6 See Matheson, supra note 83, at 159-60. 
197 See Safe Lane, The Ottawa Pmcess and Canada's Position, supra note 19. 
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War.206 Additionally, the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation has 
been very active in speaking out against land mines and advocating a 
total ban on their use by the U.S.207 These ban supporters argue that 
land mines are unnecessary to defend U.S. troops in South Korea. 208 
They cite the strength of the American military, the lack of technology 
possessed by the Korean forces and a recent study by the Pentagon 
which stated that land mines were not necessary to defend troops 
abroad.209 
Despite the inability to get the support of nations such as the U.S., 
Russia and China, several countries that have ratified the Ottawa Treaty 
are now looking into measures to help expedite their commitments to 
the treaty.210 For example, as mentioned earlier, Great Britain is so 
committed to the obligations imposed on it by treaty that it has prom-
ised to speed up the time frame for completely banning the use of land 
mines. 211 
By treaty, the 125 signers have pledged themselves to some very lofty 
goals. The preamble to the treaty welcomes the adoption of the treaty 
in order to: 
put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-per-
sonnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every 
week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially 
children, obstruct economic development and reconstruc-
tion, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally dis-
places [people], and have other severe consequences for 
years after emplacement .... 212 
It also places on the signers a responsibility to do "their utmost to 
contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the chal-
lenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, 
and to assure their destruction"213 while doing "their utmost in provid-
ing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and 
economic reintegration, of mine victims .... "214 
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III. ANALYSIS 
Despite what appears to be a striking victory in the effort against the 
proliferation of land mines, upon closer inspection, it seems highly 
unlikely that the Ottawa Treaty will be very effective in achieving a 
world wide ban. Several deterrents stand in the way of that goal. The 
initial problem is that several large military powers have not accepted 
the treaty.215 Additionally, the Treaty itself, although a very good start 
to taking care of a serious problem, does not adequately address the 
fact that many land mine-infested countries lack the financial resources 
necessary for removal efforts and for reparations to victims, nor does 
it provide concrete sanctions for member states who do not comply 
with the provisions of the treaty. 
A. Lack of Support for a Land Mine Ban from Major Military Powers 
As noted earlier, the failure to get countries like the V.S., Russia, 
and China to ratify the Ottawa Treaty, was seen as a big disappointment 
to ban supporters.216 Consequently, much needs to be done to ensure 
that these countries gain acceptance of the Ottawa Treaty. The fact that 
the V.S. did not commit itself to the treaty has been especially criticized 
both at home and abroad.217 Domestically, criticism has been so sharp 
that bipartisan ban supporters in Congress put together proposed 
legislation that, if adopted, would ban the use of land mines alto-
gether.218 But even if this legislation is eventually ratified within the V.S. 
(a situation that does not seem very likely given the political divide this 
issue seems to elicit within the country), it may not do much towards 
solving the land mine issue world wide. Due to the lack of global 
commitment to the banning of land mines completely, it seems very 
unlikely that even with V.S. support, the advocates of a ban will be able 
to gain acceptance from non-signer nations who rely on land mines to 
protect against aggressors. 
Republican Senator Jesse Helms echoed this concern by remarking 
"[t]he absence from the negotiating table of countries such as Russia, 
China, Iran, India and Vietnam suggests that any treaty produced in 
Oslo will do little to end the indiscriminate carnage and devastation 
215 See Brown, supra note 174. 
216 See Landmines: Treaty Endorsed by 100 Cauntries but not United States, supra note 184. 
217 See id. 
218 See Brown, supra note 174. 
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caused by anti-personnel land mines .... "219 This bleak assessment is 
probably correct in light of the fact that these nations comprise both 
the heaviest users and the heaviest producers of land mines.22o 
B. YVho Will Pay to Remove the Land Mines and YVho Will Provide 
Damages to Those YVho Are Injured or Killed? 
In addition to the lack of global support for a land mine ban, the 
Ottawa Treaty suffers from additional problems that make it unlikely 
that a successful ban effort will take place. One such issue is culpability. 
Article 5 of the Ottawa Treaty places responsibility on all parties to: 
1. [d]estroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel 
mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon 
as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into 
forces of this Convention for that State Party. 
2. [m] ake every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdic-
tion or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or 
suspect to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible 
that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its juris-
diction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and pro-
tected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective 
exclusion of civilians until all anti-personnel mines contained 
therein have been destroyed .... 221 
The article provides for who shall take responsibility but ignores the 
reality that many land mine affected countries do not have the tech-
nological means or money necessary to "demine" their land mines. For 
those countries who cannot meet the Treaty deadlines, Article 5 in-
cludes a process for requesting an extension of the deadline for com-
pleting the destruction of the land mines,222 but the extension of the 
deadline can only be effective if the requesting party can convince 
other treaty signers to help the mined country in achieving its mis-
sion.223 Art. 5, paragraph 5 states that the "Meeting of the States Parties 
or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors 
contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority 
219 See Lobe, supra note 20!. 
220 See Landmines: Fallout of War, supra note 17; Landmines: Treaty Endorsed by 100 Countries 
but not United States, supra note 184. 
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of votes of States Parties who are presen t and who vote whether to gran t 
the request for an extension period."224 However, the provision does 
not give any concrete guidelines on how the party is to achieve its treaty 
responsibilities even if an extension is granted. 
Article 6, entitled "International Cooperation and Assistance," pro-
vides for assistance to those parties who are unable to achieve their 
treaty responsibilities. 225 The article states that all party members have 
"the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible" from the other 
state parties. 226 The article also states that parties have the right to 
engage in a technological exchange to fulfill the mission of the treaty227 
but it does not require each party to do so. Paragraph 2 of this article, 
however, states that the parties shall not "impose undue restrictions on 
the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological 
information for humanitarian purposes"228 indicating that when a party 
is asked for such information, that party will provide the information 
freely and completely. 
Paragraphs 3-5 of Article 5 state that each party in a position to do 
so shall: "provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social 
and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness 
programs"; provide assistance in clearing mines; and provide assistance 
in destroying stockpiled land mines. 229 The treaty, however, does not 
establish a method for determining who can provide assistance and 
does not state what kind of assistance must be provided. 
Paragraph 5 states that the parties can ask the U.N. or other com-
petent third party, such as a non-governmental organization, to assist 
the party in developing a program that will ensure the removal of land 
mines.23o The third party would assist in determining the scope of the 
land mine problem, what resources are currently available within the 
infested nation to deal with the problem, the amount of time necessary 
to adequately deal with the problem, assistance to victims, and what 
programs should be put in place to educate the public.231 However, in 
making a third party responsible for crafting a solution, the requesting 
nation lacks the support of treaty parties who can help realize the 
224 See id. at 1511, art. 5, para. 5. 
225 See id. at 1511-12. 
226 Ottawa Treaty, supm note 78, 361.L.M. at 1511-12, art. 6, para. 1. 
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program through financial resources and through their placing pres-
sure on non-complying countries. 
Moreover, subsection 5 charges "each state party in a position to do 
so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled mines" but 
again, it does not provide a mechanism for determining which parties 
are implicated and how much assistance will be necessary to satisfy 
their obligation.232 
Despite the amount of detail these articles provide, the treaty relies 
on non-specific compliance measures and leaves it up to the individual 
parties to ask for and offer help to nations who cannot achieve the 
treaty's goals themselves. 233 The treaty provides a general mandate for 
each state party "giving and receiving assistance under the provisions 
of this Article [to] cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and 
prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs.234 However, 
history has shown that voluntary measures such as these, especially in 
light of the fact that many major countries have not agreed to the 
obligations of the treaty, have fallen short of their goal.2% 
C. VVhat Is the Sanction for Not Following the Mandates of the Treaty? 
Another deficiency of the Treaty is its self-enforcement mechanism 
for ensuring compliance with the obligations of the Treaty. The self-
enforcement mechanisms do not provide concrete procedures. For 
example, Article 9 discusses the National Implementation Measures 
required, by stating:23G "Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, 
administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal 
sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State 
Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory 
under its jurisdiction or control."237 However, if a nation does not pass 
laws prohibiting that nation's use of land mines or if the nation con-
tinues to use land mines after signing the treaty, it is unclear what 
measures can be enacted by the other Treaty members and even if 
those measures will be respected by the sanctioned nation. 238 
232 See id. at 1512. 
233 See id. 
234 See id. at 1511-12. 
235 See Partsch, supra note 100, at 325. 
236 See Ottawa Treaty, supra note 78, 36 I.L.M. at 1515, art. 9. 
237 See id. 
238It appears this fear has already come to fruition. The Human Rights Watch reports that 
"[t]he government of Angola-a treaty signatory-is once again laying mines .... " See Human 
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The treaty supporters might consider creating embargoes or finan-
cial penalties for breaking the provisions of the treaty. Such a measure 
requires the parties to formulate some type of hearing procedure to 
hear charges of non-compliance before imposing sanctions but cur-
rently, the Treaty does not provide that kind of specificity. 
Similarly, Article 10, entitled "Settlement of Disputes" provides that 
the State Parties will work together to settle disputes that arise through 
the Treaty.239 The Treaty suggests each country offer "its good offices 
in calling upon the States [sic] parties" not in compliance.24o Presum-
ably, such diplomacy measures will help remedy any problem which 
may arise from the obligations of the treaty.241 Again, despite this 
suggestion, the Treaty does not provide a more concrete procedure for 
how such matters will be resolved.242 
A mitigating provision provides that the state parties will meet regu-
larly to "consider any matter with regard to the application or imple-
mentation of this Convention .... "24~ This provision will perhaps be 
the forum for which many of these issues will be worked out. Only time 
will tell what further work may be necessary to make this a truly strong, 
enforceable treaty. 
D. Possible Solutions 
Although the Ottawa Treaty suffers from problems which make its 
probability for success unlikely, there are some concrete measures 
Treaty supporters can take to correct some of the treaty's deficiencies. 
These ideas center around shedding more worldwide media exposure 
on the problem, putting a committee together to help tighten up and 
make recommendations for how to achieve the treaty's goals, and 
creating a committee to deal with how non-compliance with the treaty's 
mandates will be handled. 
One of the most effective ways to ensure that more countries ratifY 
the Ottawa Treaty is to constantly shed more media attention on the 
matter. A good example of this is the media attention the anti-land 
mine campaign received after Princess Diana's involvement with the 
Rights Watch, Histaric Landrnine Ban Tt-eaty Takes Effect, (visited Apr. 1, 1999) <http://www.hrw. 
org/hrw /press/ 1999 /feb/3199.htm>. 
239 See Ottawa Treaty, supra note 78, 36 I.L.M. at 1516, art. 10. 
240Id. 
241Id. 
242 See id. 
243 See id. 
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issue. Princess Diana's highly publicized trips to land mine-infested 
countries did much to focus the world's attention on the devastation 
caused to human life. 
Additionally, in the U.S., the activities of ban supporters created 
political heat for President Clinton after he declined to sign the Ottawa 
Treaty.244 Such political backlash ensued that legislation was proposed 
in Congress to create an independent ban for the U.S. Moreover, more 
recently, President Clinton, spurred by active criticism by land mine 
ban supporters promised that the U.S. would stop using anti-personnel 
mines by 2006 if a suitable alternative to land mines is found. 245 While 
getting the U.S. to sign alone will not solve the larger issue of convinc-
ing the heaviest users and producers of land mines to ratify the Treaty, 
strong U.S. support might convince some of the hold-out nations to 
reconsider their position on the matter. Additionally, the United States 
and other Treaty supporters can exert international pressure on the 
non-complying nations to either support the ban or at least to comply 
with some of the Treaty'S provisions. 
To combat the problem of lack of specificity in achieving Treaty goals 
and the lack of culpability regarding who is to act and in what instance, 
the Treaty signers must convene a subcommittee responsible for clari-
fYing Treaty requirements and offering guidelines for the Treaty sup-
porters to follow in complying with the mission of the Treaty. 
For example, this subcommittee can be responsible for pairing mem-
ber states that need financial and technological assistance with nations 
and organizations that can provide those resources. Currently, the 
Treaty only provides for those countries in a position to do so to 
contribute financial and technological resources. The subcommittee 
might determine which countries would be able to provide financial 
and technological help and then pair those nations with countries most 
affected by land mines and who need assistance. In this way, the 
requirement to act becomes more specific rather than just a general-
ized requirement to assist. 
Additionally, the Treaty subcommittee can also be responsible for 
maintaining a fund where requesting nations can receive financial 
resources to help pay for demining efforts and to help pay reparations 
to innocent victims of land mines. Such a fund would be administered 
244 Landmines: Treaty Endorsed fry 100 Countries but not United States, supra note 184. 
245 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 238. However, many doubt that the U.S. is serious 
about this goal especially in light of the fact that Congress has designated $50 million for a new 
mine system which would be prohibited if the U.S. ratifies the ban treaty. See id. 
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by the Treaty signers and would be in addition to already existing fund 
programs set up by independent worldwide organizations. The fund 
itself could have two features-a voluntary participation mechanism 
for those countries who would like to contribute resources in the effort 
to make reparations to victims and help clear mined areas, and the 
fund can include a compulsory mechanism that requires those coun-
tries who insist on using land mines to provide a fund to make sure 
land mines are cleared after a specific military objective is achieved. 
The subcommittee can also make recommendations for how specific 
objectives within the Ottawa Treaty could be achieved. 
In order to ensure that compliance with the Treaty's mandates 
occurs, the Treaty members can create another subcommittee spe-
cifically convened to deal with nations who violate the terms of the 
treaty. A hearing mechanism or some combined investigation proce-
dure action with the United Nations might be required to ensure that 
charges of non-compliance are brought before a legitimate tribunal to 
lend credibility to the sanctions imposed. If a nation brought before a 
hearing process is found to have violated the terms of the treaty, the 
subcommittee should have a proscribed list of remedies and sanctions 
to use against the non-conforming nation. The hearing should have 
the majority support of all Treaty members and the United Nations. 
CONCLUSION 
The ratification of the Ottawa Treaty has been a significant advance 
towards stopping the proliferation of land mines. Despite the strong 
step in the right direction, much work must now be done to convince 
those nations who have not ratified the Treaty to come forth to do so. 
The Treaty will never be truly effective until the major international 
powers that produce land mines or who heavily rely on their use also 
agree to the Treaty's provisions. Measures such as strong public sup-
port of a ban and sanctions to control nations who disregard the 
mandates of existing treaties should be employed to persuade the 
entire international community to ban the use of land mines. 
Additionally, the Ottawa Treaty should explicitly revise the Treaty to 
clearly define expectations and responsibilities of the parties. For ex-
ample, a more specific plan for providing assistance to land mine 
infested nations and victims of land mines should be developed includ-
ing a system for pairing less developed nations with nations equipped 
to provide assistance and/or a fund from which the less developed 
nation or victims can draw. Similarly, work needs to be done to ensure 
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that a subcommittee of the Treaty supporters is able to enforce the 
treaty by providing sanctions against non-complying nations. With 
more attention to the matter and the continued efforts of the support-
ers of a land mine ban, universal acceptance may be achieved within 
the next several years. 
Yvette Politis 
